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Supporting Patient Autonomy: The Importance of Clinician-patient Relationships
Abstract
Personal autonomy is widely valued. Recognition of its vulnerability in health care contexts led to the
inclusion of respect for autonomy as a key concern in biomedical ethics. The principle of respect for
autonomy is usually associated with allowing or enabling patients to make their own decisions about
which health care interventions they will or will not receive. In this paper, we suggest that a strong focus
on decision situations is problematic, especially when combined with a tendency to stress the importance
of patients' independence in choosing. It distracts attention from other important aspects of and
challenges to autonomy in health care. Relational understandings of autonomy attempt to explain both
the positive and negative implications of social relationships for individuals' autonomy. They suggest that
many health care practices can affect autonomy by virtue of their effects not only on patients' treatment
preferences and choices, but also on their self-identities, self-evaluations and capabilities for autonomy.
Relational understandings de-emphasise independence and facilitate well-nuanced distinctions between
forms of clinical communication that support and that undermine patients' autonomy. These
understandings support recognition of the value of good patient-professional relationships and can enrich
the specification of the principle of respect for autonomy.
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Personal autonomy is widely valued. Recognition of its vulnerability in health care contexts led to the
inclusion of respect for autonomy as a key concern in biomedical ethics. The principle of respect for
autonomy is usually associated with allowing or enabling patients to make their own decisions about
which health care interventions they will or will not receive. In this paper, we suggest that a strong
focus on decision situations is problematic, especially when combined with a tendency to stress the
importance of patients’ independence in choosing. It distracts attention from other important
aspects of and challenges to autonomy in health care. Relational understandings of autonomy
attempt to explain both the positive and negative implications of social relationships for individuals’
autonomy. They suggest that many health care practices can affect autonomy by virtue of their
effects not only on patients’ treatment preferences and choices, but also on their self-identities, selfevaluations and capabilities for autonomy. Relational understandings de-emphasise independence
and facilitate well-nuanced distinctions between forms of clinical communication that support and
that undermine patients’ autonomy. These understandings support recognition of the value of good
patient-professional relationships and can enrich the specification of the principle of respect for
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Personal autonomy is widely valued: most people think it is preferable to somehow be their own
person and shape their own lives than to live under the control of others. Recognition of the
particular vulnerability of patients’ autonomy has underpinned the inclusion of respect for
autonomy as a key concern in biomedical ethics.1–3
In this paper, we highlight some limitations of prevailing ideas about the principle of respect for
autonomy and argue that relational understandings of autonomy offer useful additional insights for
clinical contexts. These understandings highlight the importance of social relationships for autonomy
capability. We believe they could help clinicians to recognise how their interactions and relationships
with patients can either enable or impair patients’ autonomy.

RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY: PREVAILING IDEAS
Considerations of respect for autonomy in health care contexts tend to focus on situations in which
decisions need to be made about health care interventions. A principle of respect for autonomy is
also invoked in discussions about confidentiality, fidelity, privacy and truth-telling,1 but is most
strongly associated with the idea that patients should be allowed or enabled to make autonomous
decisions about their health care.1,3–9 Beauchamp and Childress’ influential definition identifies
autonomous decisions as those made intentionally and with substantial understanding and freedom
from controlling influences.1

Various criticisms have been made about this construal of the principle of respect for autonomy.3–9
Some are more fairly levelled against simplified understandings of the principle that sometimes
emerge in practice than against Beauchamp and Childress’s nuanced discussion of it. They most
strongly indict those understandings that put more emphasis on offering and allowing choice than
on enabling informed decision-making—most notably the idea that respect for autonomy obliges
clinicians to tell patients about health care options then stand back and abide by their choices. The
concerns we outline below also apply most strongly to simplified understandings of respect for
autonomy that emphasise the value of independence. But our concerns reflect Beauchamp and
Childress’ focus on autonomous decisions, and we do want to suggest there is scope to improve on
their specification of the principle.
The idea that patients should be offered options and allowed to make voluntary choices about
potentially life-changing health care interventions is important. It undoubtedly discourages some
inappropriate paternalism and protects some patients from unwanted intervention, for example, by
permitting individuals to decline surgery that they consider more burdensome than beneficial. The
idea that patients should be enabled to make informed decisions also helpfully encourages attention
to individuals’ understandings of health care interventions, and supports the development and use
of potentially autonomy-enhancing patient decision aids.10
We are concerned, however, that the strong association of respect for autonomy with autonomous
decision-making has some neglected negative implications and that the focus on decisions distracts
attention from other important autonomy-related issues—especially when there is an emphasis on
the value of patients’ independence in choosing.
A strong focus on decisions may impair clinical recognition of what limited autonomy some patients
have. Beauchamp and Childress explicitly exclude people who are not ‘competent’ from the
protection of the principle of respect for autonomy.1 If clinicians are more inclined to offer and
allow choice than to enable patients to make informed choices, the principle may also fail to protect
those who are basically ‘competent’ but who struggle to choose between health care options
because, for example, they lack confidence, are not sure which option they prefer, have conflicting
priorities or anticipate blaming themselves if outcomes are poor. These patients may feel
abandoned rather than autonomous if their clinicians refuse to do more than inform them about
options and insist that they choose.11
A strong focus on decisions can lead to neglect of other situations in which patients have problems
with autonomy.3,5–7,9,12 Discussions about respect for autonomy rarely attend to the
implementation of health care choices with significant self-management implications such as healthoriented lifestyle changes. So clinicians seeking to respect patients’ autonomy might not be inclined
to attend to the problems associated with weakness of will9 or limited ‘executive function’12, which
impair people’s efforts to enact their preferred behaviours to achieve their health-related goals (for
example, to persist with eating, exercise and glucose-monitoring plans to avoid adverse
complications of diabetes).
Finally, a strong focus on decisions may distract attention from health care practices that undermine
people’s autonomy by limiting their scope and confidence to act. In institutional care, for example,
procedures are often standardised to ensure efficient completion of patient care tasks. Residents
who are imposed on by these procedures may fear to challenge those on whose care they depend.5
Clinically imposed behavioural norms may also become oppressive. In antenatal settings, for
example, women are sometimes required to shift their priorities, change their lifestyles and submit
to judgemental monitoring by health professionals in the name of health promotion.7
More relational understandings of autonomy encourage attention to these issues.

RELATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF AUTONOMY
Relational accounts share with other accounts the basic understanding of personal autonomy as
somehow being one’s own person and shaping one’s own life. What marks them out is that in
seeking to assess and explain personal autonomy, they take seriously the ideas that individuals are
always located within interpersonal relationships and broader social environments, and that these
are pervasively influential.13 Relational accounts vary, but all emphasise the significance for
autonomy of our interactions with other people and socio-cultural systems.13
Because relational understandings of autonomy accept the pervasiveness of social influences, they
de-emphasise independence. They encourage us to consider our interdependence and to ask how
and why different forms of social influence—past and present—might support or undermine a
person’s ability to live their life in their own way. The question of what is genuinely our own remains
difficult, but relational accounts recognise that we may have multiple, dynamic self-identities
because we belong to several social groups and have diverse roles within these.13 They stress that
our individual capability for autonomy is socially and situationally shaped (see Box), and that cultural
norms and social structures and practices affect the lives and identities we regard as valuable and
possible for us.5,13 These ideas can help distinguish autonomy-supporting from autonomyundermining social influences.
Factors contributing to autonomy capability:
Self-development skills
Relational accounts suggest various socially shaped skills are needed to exercise
autonomy. Diana Meyers, for example, argued that in order to discover, define and direct
ourselves, we need to be able to: recall and reflect on experiences; generate ideas about
alternative courses of action; think through possible consequences; express and listen to
reasons and concerns; gather resolve to act; and interpret one’s own (emotional) and
others’ (variously communicated) responses to one’s actions14,15
Self-evaluations
Several relational accounts regard (justified) positive self-evaluations as essential for
autonomy. For example, Carolyn McLeod drew attention to the requirement that people
trust themselves to: work out what they want (especially if they have conflicting desires
that reflect competing social norms); make good judgements (e.g., about which purveyors
of information to trust); choose well; and act on their choices.16 Paul Benson stressed the
importance of individuals’ sense of themselves as competent and worthy to answer for
their actions17
Scope for action within social context
Relational accounts vary in the extent to which they specify particular social conditions as
prerequisites for the exercise of autonomy.13 All recognise, however, that interpersonal
and broader social relations and social structures can exert both more and less direct
influences on the options that people ‘have’—both formally and more subjectively

IMPLICATIONS OF RELATIONAL ACCOUNTS FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE
Relational accounts encourage clinicians to consider patients’ autonomy in situations beyond
decision-making. They prompt us to consider how illness and clinical practice can affect patients’
autonomy—positively or negatively—via their influence on autonomy capability as well as values
and choices. It is widely recognised that illness can affect autonomy by challenging life plans,
necessitating changes in relationships and disrupting self-identities.2,18 Relational thinking reminds

us that illness can also impair autonomy by restricting self-development skills and undermining selfevaluations, and that its effects are mediated by social norms and practices–particularly when
symptoms or diagnostic labels are disabling or stigmatising.17
Significantly, relational accounts direct us to consider health care interactions and health services
among the social processes and contexts that can exacerbate or alleviate the implications of illness
for autonomy. They suggest that clinical interactions can support the autonomy of people with
challenging symptoms, diagnoses or treatments by helping them to form, maintain or re-establish
self-identities that they are comfortable with, and to deal with emotions and social stigma.5
Relational thinking would, for example, view efforts to help people with schizophrenia to develop
life narratives that incorporate their condition as autonomy-supportive as well as potentially
therapeutic.19
Relational thinking also suggests that dismissive and negatively judgemental comments can impair
autonomy as well as signify disrespect. For example, a clinician who ignores or denies a patient’s
reports of symptoms or concerns, or who expresses annoyance that a patient is too heavy for
standard hospital equipment, risks challenging that person’s self-identity and undermining their selfevaluation (and so autonomy capability)—with negative implications for their autonomy within and
perhaps beyond that particular health care encounter.
Relational accounts can enrich thinking about treatment decision-making. They encourage
consideration of whether and how clinicians inform patients about a menu of options, but also
about which options are (un)available and why.20 They encourage questions about whether and
how clinicians might help people assess external influences in relation to their own autonomy.
Clinicians might, for example, draw attention to the values and interests behind advertisements for
lifestyle drugs and beauty-enhancing surgical procedures, and encourage people to consider these
against their own values.3 They might encourage patients to seek and use autonomy-supporting
resources and networks such as relevant websites or patient groups.21
Because they highlight the socially shaped and situation-specific nature of autonomy capability,
relational accounts can facilitate nuanced assessments of the forms of support clinicians might offer
people usually deemed incompetent and people who struggle with particular decisions.
We previously suggested that recommendations about screening are more likely to be autonomysupportive if accompanied by honest and meaningful explanations of their basis, facilitation of
personal assessments of their appropriateness, opportunities for discussion and clear scope to
reasonably decline recommended tests.22 Relational thinking suggests recommendations about
treatment are more likely to be autonomy-supportive if made by clinicians who: seek to promote
patients’ autonomy and not just narrow health gain; listen to patients; explain how they have taken
personal circumstances, concerns and preferences into account in their recommendations; enable
patients to query and if necessary correct their understandings about them; and ensure patients feel
they could choose against the recommendation without jeopardising their ongoing care.
The recognition that supportive relationships are sometimes more facilitative of enactments of
autonomy than concern to allow independence is particularly significant for clinicians’ efforts to help
people manage their health conditions and risks. It suggests that clinicians can respect as well as
promote patients’ autonomy when they intervene to help them ‘stick to’ their behavioural goals—
especially when patients recognise and own their difficulties and seek or welcome supportive
intervention.23
The difference between autonomy-supportive and autonomy-undermining communication might
sometimes be subtle, and cannot be judged without understanding the significance of
communication from the patient’s perspective (and perhaps from the clinician’s too). Because
relational thinking often supports intervention as promoting autonomy, there is a danger that

misunderstandings and misappropriations of ideas derived from relational accounts could encourage
the kinds of inappropriate paternalism that ethical norms of respect for autonomy are meant to
protect against. Relational accounts will not generate simple action lists for clinicians that guarantee
protection for patients’ autonomy. Rather, by drawing attention to the significance of social
relationships for individuals’ autonomy capabilities as well as their values, they offer useful
conceptual resources for thinking about the implications of health care for autonomy.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Relational understandings of patient autonomy could underpin an enriched specification of the
principle of respect for autonomy. They encourage recognition that concern about patients’
autonomy is relevant in many health care contexts. They encourage clinicians to attend to the
implications of health care interactions for patients’ self-identities, life-plans and autonomy
capabilities. They facilitate recognition of potentially oppressive aspects of health care regimens, and
they support the development of respectful, bilateral relationships that enable patients to develop
and exercise self-governance skills, both within and beyond health care encounters.
Relational accounts render all communication with patients potentially significant for their
autonomy, and treat any interactions that belittle or undermine patients as potentially problematic.
In this sense, they are demanding on clinicians. However, we think they will resonate positively with
the values and practices of the countless clinicians who strive to act with integrity2 and recognise
the importance of relationships for good quality care.24 Relational accounts of autonomy are
congruent with patients’ judgements that interpersonal relationships and engagement in activities
other than choosing are important for their sense of involvement in their health care.25 By
broadening the focus beyond decision points and de-emphasising independence, they enhance
scope for the exercise of professional expertise and caring alongside respect for autonomy.26 The
balance between allowing and enabling patients to make decisions (and, more generally, the balance
between recognising and supporting exercises of autonomy) still needs careful consideration, but
relational accounts should facilitate this. They could reinvigorate thinking about autonomy in health
care, and they warrant serious consideration in discussions about clinical ethics.
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